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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

The case of the Malleable Iron Range Company, decided in the court of
claims of the United States, is of interest in that the court disallowed a deduc
tion taken in the year in which the amount of a judgment for infringement of
patents was decreed by a lower court. The judgment was appealed by the
taxpayer to a higher court, and later a final decision increasing the amount of
the judgment against the taxpayer was issued. The court of claims held that
in carrying the judgment case to the higher court, the taxpayer had, in effect,
denied the liability at that time, and the amount of the claim against it was not
a deductible loss until final judgment was issued. This decision undoubtedly
is based on sound logic, but it would appear that the taxpayer had, by the act
of recording the liability fixed by the lower court in its books of account, ac
knowledged a liability, and this acknowledgment was not offset entirely by
its act of litigating the case further. From the viewpoint of an accountant,
it would appear that the setting up of the liability in the books at the time the
first judgment was decreed should have greater evidential weight than the
continuance of the litigation. The management of an enterprise might con
clude that there was actually a liability but for strategic reasons continue the
contest.
In a somewhat similar case (appeal of Bump Confectionery Company to
B. T. A., docket 451) the board held that:
“A liability to respond to damages for breach of contract occurring in
1920, which taxpayer does not admit to the injured party and does not
accrue on its books, is not a proper deduction for the taxable year in which
the breach occurred.”

The fact that the liability was not recorded in the books seems to have been
considered as of weight in determining this case. In another case it was held
that as the oral testimony given did not exactly coincide with the entries of the
transactions in the books of account, the latter furnished more weighty evi
dence than did the oral testimony. While there are all sorts of bookkeeping
practices in use, seldom does one find any deviation from the practice of not
setting up liabilities until they are actually incurred.
Some decisions are being promulgated lately upon the subject of the statute
of limitations, and as this question is constantly confronting taxpayers and
their representatives, these decisions warrant careful study.
In the case of Anderson v. The United States, tried before the circuit court of
appeals, the commissioner, curiously enough, indicted the taxpayer for attempt
ing to defeat the tax under the 1918 act because the taxpayer made no return
when his net income was less than the amount fixed by the statute as requiring
a return to be made. The commissioner charged that as the gross income was
of a considerable amount the return should have been made. The commis
sioner’s position would have been correct under any of the acts subsequent to
that of 1918, but in that act it was not necessary for an individual taxpayer to
make a return if his net income was less than $1,000 if single, or $2,000, if
married, etc.
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SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Suit for refund of 1918 taxes is barred when brought over two years after
denial of refund petition and over five years after tax was paid. (Court of
claims of United States, Lopez v. United States.)
Date of allowance of refund is date of commissioner’s final approval, and
interest is payable until then.
Where the tax for 1919 was paid in instalments, then under section 250 (b)
of the 1918 act, interest on an overassessment did not begin to run until the
payments exceeded the total amount of tax actually due. (Supreme court of
the United States, Blair, commissioner, v. United States ex. rel. Birkenhead and
Ronon, executors.)
Annual payments for fifteen years under an agreement made prior to 1913
in consideration of the surrender of the right to renewal insurance premiums on
policies previously written do not constitute taxable income when received,
except as to excess over the discounted obligation. (United States district
court, Platt v. Bowers.)
A judgment for internal-revenue taxes illegally collected should cover interest
from payment until judgment, or final judgment if appealed, but such judg
ment does not bear interest.
A certificate of probable cause converts a judgment against the collector
to one against the commissioner. (United States district court, E.D. Michigan
S.D., Burrows et al. v. Woodworth, collector.)
“A gratuitous appropriation” for “wise and proper” distribution to officers
and employees was held not a gift, but taxable income given for past services
for bringing about a sale of the corporate assets and for the resulting loss of
positions. (Circuit court of claims, fourth district, John C. Noel, collector, v.
John H. Parrott.)
Additional premiums on account of double indemnity and disability clauses
in a life-insurance policy are taxable as casualty insurance. (Circuit court of
appeals for second district, United States v. New York Life Insurance Company.)
A court action for a refund upon a ground admitted to be correct and allowed
as a credit against a proposed additional assessment may not be brought, where
an appeal from the additional assessment has been taken and is pending before
the board of tax appeals. (United States district court, W.D. Pennsylvania,
Charles L. Suhr v. United States.)
Under the 1918 act, a return is not required when net income is less than the
amount fixed by statute (gross income being immaterial) and an indictment for
attempting to defeat the tax is insufficient which does not allege facts bringing
accused within the statute. (Circuit court of appeals, seventh district,
Anderson v. United States.)
Income which at the trustee’s discretion is partly payable to or for benefi
ciaries and the balance invested for them, is, under the 1921 and prior acts,
taxable to the beneficiaries as “income which is to be distributed to the bene
ficiaries periodically.” (United States district court, Minnesota, third district,
John G. Ordway, et al., trustees, v. Wilcutts, collector.)
Where a judgment against a taxpayer on an accrual basis is appealed, it is
not a deductible loss until the year in which the litigation is ended. (Court
of claims of the United States, Malleable Iron Range Company v. United States.)
Taxable net estate under the 1918 act does not include property irrevocably
transferred to trustee in 1910, 75% of the income to be paid decedent while he
and his wife lived and 50% to survivor; balance to children, and upon the death
of survivor trust to terminate and estate distributed to children. (Court of
claims of United States, George P. Miller etal., trustees, v. United States.)
A live-stock commission corporation which upon making a sale immediately
gives consignor its cheque, or which makes purchases for customers from its
own funds, although almost immediately reimbursed, is not a personal-service
corporation, because capital is a material income producing factor. (United
States district court, S.D. Ohio, W. D., Hubbard-Ragsdale Company v. Dean,
collector.)
A suit for income taxes for 1918 brought over five years after return was
filed is barred by limitation, although brought about three years and five
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months after assessment. (Supreme court of District of Columbia, United
States v. Godfrey L. Cabot.)

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3880, May 10, 1926)
Article 1307: Limitations upon the crediting and refunding of taxes paid.
(Also section 213 (a), article 32.)
Income Tax—Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1924—Decision of Court
1. Statute of limitations—Claims
As a prerequisite to a suit to recover internal-revenue taxes,
a claim for refund must, under section 281 (b) of the revenue act
of 1924, be filed within four years from the time the tax was paid.
2. Income—Salary—Dividend
When the amount of a deduction claimed for salary by a com
pany is disallowed in part by the commissioner of internal revenue,
the individual receiving the salary should, under the provisions of the
revenue act of 1918, return the whole as salary and not the part dis
allowed as a dividend subject only to surtax rates.
The following decision of the United States court of claims in the case of
Hayner v. United States is published for the information of internal-revenue
officers and others concerned.

Court of Claims of the United States
George M. Hayner v. The United States
On demurrer to the petition
[May 10, 1926]
Graham, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is averred in the petition that the plaintiff as president of the George
M. Hayner Co. received from said company as salary, in the year 1918, the
sum of $13,195.79. He made his individual income-tax return, including the
amount stated as salary, and paid his tax on March 15, 1919. In its income
and excess-profits tax return for 1918, the George M. Hayner Co. reported as
expense the amount paid to plaintiff as salary. After the audit of the com
pany’s return, the treasury department, in a letter dated December 24, 1923,
disallowed as salary $3,195 of the amount paid plaintiff, upon the ground that
the amount should be treated as a dividend, and assessed the normal tax
thereon against the company. This assessment, amounting to $84.87, was
paid by the company on March 12, 1924. On June 22, 1924, plaintiff filed a
claim for refund of $383.40 because of the normal tax on $3,195 disallowed
as salary and treated as a dividend to him from the George M. Hayner Co.
The claim was disallowed on March 5, 1925, upon the ground that it was
barred by section 281 (b) of the revenue act of June 2, 1924 (43 Stat., 301),
which provides that: “. . . no such credit or refund shall be allowed or made
after four years from the time the tax was paid, unless before the expiration of
such four years a claim therefor is filed by the taxpayer, ...”
The plaintiff contends that he had no basis for a claim for refund on account
of the normal tax paid at the source by the George M. Hayner Co. until after
the action of the commissioner of internal revenue disallowing as salary $3,195,
on December 24, 1923, and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until the accrual of the plaintiff’s right of action.
It is admitted that the plaintiff received as salary $13,195.79 and returned
it as such for taxation. It does not appear that he has returned, or has been
called upon to return, any of it to the company. Although the treasury
department held that a part of the sum paid him should be accounted for by
the company as a dividend, this does not alter the fact that plaintiff received
it as salary. Having received it as salary, he was called upon to account for
it as such in his return. He paid his tax on March 15, 1919, and filed a claim
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for refund on June 22, 1924, over five years afterwards. The language of
the statute is plain and must be construed according to its terms, and, as it
is in the nature of an indulgence to the taxpayer, it must be strictly construed.
It says that a claim for refund must be filed within four years from the date
of the payment of the tax. The plaintiff has attempted to construe the pay
ment of the tax by the company as the payment of the tax by him. The two
payments are entirely separate, and the statute of 1924 above provides no
exception for such a case as the plaintiff presents.
The demurrer should be sustained and the petition dismissed. It is so
ordered.
(T. D. 3884, June 5, 1926)
Article 1351: Suits for recovery of taxes erroneously collected.
Income Tax—Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1924—Decision of Court
Statute of limitations—Suits
Under section 3226 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the
revenue act of 1924, a suit to recover internal-revenue taxes is barred
unless brought within five years from the date of payment of the tax
or within two years after the disallowance of that part of the claim
for refund or credit to which the suit relates.
The following decision of the United States court of claims in the case of
Virgil J. Lopez v. United States is published for the information of internal
revenue officers and others concerned.
United States Court of Claims
Virgil J. Lopez v. United States
On demurrer to amended petition
[May 17, 1926]
Graham, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is alleged in the petition that during the year 1918 the plaintiff, who
was president, treasurer, superintendent, and manager of V. Lopez & Co., Inc.,
owned 1 share of stock of said company; his brother, Louis L. Lopez, who
was secretary of the company, owned 1 share of stock, and the remaining
358 shares were owned by Mrs. Aimee C. Lopez, mother of the plaintiff and
said Louis L. Lopez. Mrs. Aimee C. Lopez was vice-president and assistant
general manager of said company but was not actively engaged in the affairs
of the company, the plaintiff and his brother having complete charge of the
business.
The averments of the petition are vague. The principal one is as follows:
“ In its income and excess-profits tax return for 1918, V. Lopez & Co., Inc.,
reported as expense certain salary paid to the plaintiff. Upon the audit of the
income and excess-profits tax return of V. Lopez & Co., Inc., the treasury
department, under date of February 12, 1921, advised V. Lopez & Co., Inc.,
that it disallowed a portion of the salary paid to the plaintiff and to Louis
L. Lopez and Aimee C. Lopez. As a consequence of the disallowance of such
salary as expense, V. Lopez & Co., Inc., was. compelled to pay and did pay
on July 18, 1921, an additional tax of $4,758.95, which represented an addi
tional tax of $4,799.73 for 1918 less and overpayment of $40.78 for 1917.
Plaintiff paid the tax December 18, 1919.”
The petition avers that in due course plaintiff filed with the commissioner
of internal revenue a claim for refund of $832.44, which it is alleged "was
a portion of the tax paid in accordance with plaintiff’s original individual
return, on the ground that the amount disallowed as a salary deduction on
the return of V. Lopez & Co., Inc., had been treated as a dividend by the
officials auditing the corporation’s return,” and that “Therefore the normal
tax on $6,937, which was the share of the taxpayer’s salary disallowed as a
deduction to the corporation, should not bear normal tax in computing the
tax paid by the plaintiff in accordance with section 216 of the revenue act
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of 1918.” Under date of November 25, 1922, the commissioner denied plain
tiff’s claim for refund. The plaintiff sues to recover $832.44, with interest
from December 18, 1919.
From the foregoing it will be observed that the petition does not state the
amount of salary received by plaintiff. It does not set out the date on which
plaintiff filed his claim for refund, and it fails to recite any facts which would
explain how the sum of $832.44 claimed was arrived at. However, there
seems to be enough in the facts to reach a conclusion of law.
The petition states that V. Lopez & Co., Inc., paid the additional tax assessed
on July 18, 1921, so it is fair to assume that some time after that date the
plaintiff filed his claim for refund. His claim was denied on November 25,
1922. The plaintiff paid his tax on December 18, 1919. The petition was filed
on December 11, 1925. It will thus be seen that the petition was filed more
than two years after the denial of the claim for refund and more than five
years after the tax was paid.
Section 3226 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act of June 2, 1924
(ch. 234, sec. 1014, 43 Stat., 253, 343), provides:
“No suit . . . shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
commissioner of internal revenue. ... No such suit . . . shall be begun
. . . after the expiration of five years from the date of the payment of such
tax . . . unless such suit ... is begun within two years after the disallowance
of the part of such claim to which such suit . . . relates.”
The language of this statute is plain. The principles involved in the ap
plication of it to the facts in this case are set out in the case of Louis L. Lopez
v. The United States (E-604), this day decided. See also case of Hayner v.
United States (No. E-600 [see page 8]), decided May 10, 1926.
The demurrer is sustained and the petition dismissed.
(T. D. 3881, June 2, 1926)
Article 31: What included in gross income.
Income Tax—Revenue Act of 1921—Decision of Supreme Court
Income—Gain—Loss
Income, within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment, is not
received when, by reason of the diminution of the value of the
German marks, a loan of marks is repaid in marks for a less amount
in terms of dollars, where the money borrowed was lost and the
result of the whole transaction was a loss. The mere diminution of
loss is not gain, profit, or income.
The following decision of the United States supreme court in the case of
Frank K. Bowers, collector of internal revenue, v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. is pub
lished for the information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States
Frank K. Bowers, collector of internal revenue, second district of New York,
plaintiff in error, v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.
In error to the district court of the United States for the southern district of
New York
[May 3, 1926]
Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the court.
Defendant in error, a New York corporation, sued to recover $5,198.77 paid
under protest on account of income taxes for 1921. Revenue act of 1921 (ch.
136, 42 Stat., 227, 252, et seq.).
It owned all the capital stock of H. S. Kerbaugh, Inc., engaged in the per
formance of large construction contracts, and applied to the Deutsche Bank of
Germany, through its New York representative, for loans to finance the work
being done by its subsidiary. The bank agreed that it would make the loans
by cabling to the credit of its New York representative German marks equiv
alent in dollars to the requirements of defendant in error, upon condition that
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the loans would be evidenced by notes payable as to principal and interest in
marks or their equivalent in United States gold coin at prime bankers’ rate in
New York for cable transfers to Berlin. June 8, 1911, defendant in error
advised the New York representative of the amount in dollars then needed; he
notified his principal and it put to his credit in a New York bank marks equiv
alent to the amount of money of the United States applied for. Then he drew
his cheque payable in dollars against the credit and gave it to defendant in
error, and in exchange received the promissory note of the latter payable
in marks or their equivalent in gold coin of the United States. Prior to July
2, 1913, 24 loans were made in this manner, amounting in all to $1,983,000.
The equivalent in marks was 8,341,337.50. September 1, 1913, there remained
unpaid 6,740,800 marks. The notes of defendant in error then outstanding
were surrendered and its new note for that amount was given. And when that
note became due it was renewed. Partial payments were made and, by March
31, 1915, the principal was reduced to 3,216,445 marks.
The several amounts from time to time borrowed by defendant in error were
contemporaneously advanced to its subsidiary and were expended and lost in
and about the performance of the construction contracts. These losses were
sustained in 1913,1914,1916,1917, and 1918, and were allowed as deductions in
the subsidiary’s income-tax returns for those years. The excess of its losses
over income was more than the amount here claimed by plaintiff in error to be
income of defendant in error in 1921.
After the United States entered the war the Deutsche Bank was an alien
enemy. In 1921, on demand of the alien property custodian, defendant in
error paid him $113,688.23, in full settlement of principal and interest owing
on the note belonging to the bank. Of that amount, $80,411.12 represented
principal. The settlement was on the basis of 2½ cents per mark. Measured
b United States gold coin the difference between the value of the marks
y
borrowed at the time the loans were made and the amount paid to the cus
todian was $684,465.18. The commissioner of internal revenue, notwithstand
ing the claim of defendant in error that the amount borrowed had been lost
in construction operations carried on by it and its subsidiary and that no
income resulted from the transaction, held the amount to be income and charge
able to defendant in error for 1921. Excluding that item, the tax return for
1921 shows a deficit of $581,254.77.
The defendant in error by its complaint set forth the facts above stated
and asserted—as it still insists—that the diminution in value of the marks was
not income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment; that the item
in controversy is not within the revenue act; and that, if construed to include
it, the act would be unconstitutional. Plaintiff in error moved to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The court denied the motion and gave judgment for de
fendant in error. This writ of error was taken under section 239, judicial
code, before the amendment of February 13, 1925 (ch. 229, 43 Stat., 936, 938).
The question for decision is whether the difference between the value of
marks measured by dollars at the time of payment to the custodian and the
value when the loans were made was income.
The sixteenth amendment declares that congress shall have power to levy
and collect taxes on income, “from whatever source derived,” without appor
tionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration. It was not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any
new subject within the taxing power. Congress already had power to tax
all incomes. But taxes on incomes from some sources had been held to be
“direct taxes” within the meaning of the constitutional requirement as to
apportionment. (Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3, sec. 9, cl. 4; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan &
Trust Co., 158 U. S., 601.) The amendment relieved from that requirement
and obliterated the distinction in that respect between taxes on income that
are direct taxes and those that are not, and so put on the same basis all
incomes, “from whatever source derived.” (Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R.,
240 U. S., 1, 17.) “Income” has been taken to mean the same thing as used
in the corporation excise-tax act of 1909, in the sixteenth amendment, and
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in the various revenue acts subsequently passed. (Southern Pacific Co. v.
Lowe, 247 U. S., 330, 335; Merchants L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 225 U. S., 509,
519 (T. D. 3173, C. B. 4, 34). After full consideration, this court declared that
income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital.
(Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S., 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell
Bro. Co., 247 U. S., 179, 185; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S., 189, 207 (T. D.
3010, C. B. 3, 25).) And that definition has been adhered to and applied re
peatedly. (See e. g. Merchants L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, supra, 518; Goodrich
v. Edwards, 255 U. S., 527, 535 (T. D. 3174, C. B. 4, 40); United States v.
Phellis, 257 U. S., 156, 169 (T. D. 3270, C. B. 5, 37); Miles v. Safe Deposit Co.,
259 U. S., 247, 252-253; United States v. Supplee-Biddle Co., 265 U. S., 189,
194; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S., 161, 167 (T. D. 3710, C. B. IV-1, 123); Edwards
v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U. S., 628, 633 (T. D. 3728, C. B. IV-2, 122).) In deter
mining what constitutes income substance rather than form is to be given
controlling weight. (Eisner v. Macomber, supra, 206.)
The transaction here in question did not result in gain from capital and
labor, or from either of them, or in profit gained through the sale or conversion
of capital. The essential facts set forth in the complaint are the loans in 1911,
1912, and 1913, the loss in 1913 to 1918 of the moneys borrowed, the excess
of such losses over income by more than the item here in controversy, and
payment in the equivalent of marks greatly depreciated in value. The result
of the whole transaction was a loss.
Plaintiff in error insists that in substance and effect the transaction was
a “short sale” of marks resulting in gain to defendant in error. But there
is no similarity between what was done and such a venture. A short seller
borrows what he sells, and the purchase price goes to the lender and is re
tained as security for repayment. The seller receives nothing until he repays
the loan. Such a transaction would not meet the requirements of defendant
in error. It needed the money for use and received the amount borrowed and
expended it.
The contention that the item in question is cash gain disregards the fact
that the borrowed money was lost, and that the excess of such loss over income
was more than the amount borrowed. When the loans were made and
notes given, the assets and liabilities of defendant in error were increased
alike. The loss of the money borrowed wiped out the increase of assets, but
the liability remained. The assets were further diminished by payment of
the debt. The loss was less than it would have been if marks had not declined
in value; but the mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit, or income.
Judgment affirmed.
(T. D. 3882, June 2, 1926)
Article 561: Allowable deductions.
Income Tax—Revenue Act of 1918—Decision of Court
Deductions—Loss—Bad debt.
A corporation may not deduct as a bad debt or a loss an indebted
ness created by withdrawals of its sole stockholder on the theory of
separate entities where the amounts withdrawn were not dividends
and were carried as an account receivable during the year in question
and were not charged off as a bad debt until the following year.
The following decision of the United States court of claims in the case of
Silvertown Motor Co., Inc., v. United States is published for the information of
internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Court of Claims of the United States
Silvertown Motor Co. (Inc.) v. The United States
[May 3, 1926]
OPINION

Downey, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff seeks to recover an alleged erroneous assessment against the
LaFrance Garage Co. of corporate income and excess-profits taxes for the
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calendar year 1919, which, by reason of a merger with said company,
the plaintiff was compelled to and did pay, under protest, on November 2,
In 1920 the LaFrance Garage Co. made a tax return showing a net taxable
income for the year 1919 of $1,344.59, which did not include $39,230.62 which
had been drawn out between September 15, 1919, and November 30, 1919, by
Coleman T. LaFrance, who was then the president of the company and the
owner of all of its common stock.
To enable him to buy all the common stock of the company which he did not
already own, Coleman T. LaFrance borrowed a large sum of money, hypothe
cated the stock of the company, and then began systematically to convert
assets of the company into cash, which between September 15 and November
30, of 1919, he withdrew to the amount of $39,230.62 in excess of all credit
due him and used in the payment of his individual indebtedness. This sum was
thereafter added by the commissioner of internal revenue to the income of
the said LaFrance Garage Co. for the year 1919, and an additional tax of
$14,756.27 was assessed, which the plaintiff, having in the meantime merged
with said company, was compelled to and did pay. By reason of a credit
determined to be due Coleman T. LaFrance on account of salary, a refund of
$4,462 was allowed and paid, and by reason thereof and a small conceded item
of $28.30 the amount claimed is reduced to $10,265.97.
The amount thus withdrawn by Coleman T. LaFrance was not charged to
him as a dividend; there was no action by the directors authorizing its pay
ment as a dividend, although dividends had theretofore been declared by reso
lution of the board of directors, and he made no return of it as a dividend in
his individual income-tax return, but it was carried on the books of the com
pany as an account receivable against Coleman T. LaFrance. Banking inter
ests and his brother, who was obligated on paper of the company, compelled
him to turn over such property as he had to the company, and at the end of
the year 1919 another board of directors designed by these interests took
control of the affairs of the company. No suit was instituted to recover from
Coleman T. LaFrance any part of this remaining indebtedness, but it was
recognized that at the end of the year 1919 he was wholly insolvent, and at
some time in the early part of the year 1920 this account against him was, by
the new directors, charged off as a bad debt.
The situation may be clarified by disposing of the contention that the amount
in question was paid to Coleman T. LaFrance as dividends. While it is true
that there might have been a payment of dividends without a formal declara
tion by the board of directors, and there are authorities construing payments
made as dividends although not expressly so made, there is nothing in this
transaction in any manner even tending to justify a construction of the payment
in question as dividends.
The contention is that by reason of these withdrawals by Coleman T.
LaFrance the company suffered a loss which under the revenue act of 1918
was deductible in computing net income for purposes of income and profits
taxes for the year 1919. On this phase of the case the defendant suggests that
no effort was made to collect this sum from any person other than Coleman T.
LaFrance and contends that the loss can not be considered as for the year 1919
because not charged off until some time in the early part of the year 1920.
Aside from this question, which perhaps we need not determine, one of more
substantial merit seems to present itself. Can a transaction such as this, in
any event, serve to relieve from the payment of taxes otherwise due? And
the answer must involve consideration of something broader than the mere
interpretation of words.
The statute contemplates that in computing the net income of a corporation
certain deductions may be made, among them “losses sustained during the
taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise,” and “debts
ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year.” A trans
action such as this is hardly to be characterized as a “loss” within the above
provision, but rather does it indicate the creation of a debt ascertained to be
worthless and charged off, and if to be measured and tested solely by the words
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of the statute it measures up thereto unless it be otherwise because not in fact
charged off within the calendar year.
But the statute is undoubtedly intended to deal equitably with corporate
transactions and to recognize that back of the corporate entity are the real
parties in interest—the stockholders. In determining the basis of taxation
ail of gross income is first to be ascertained, but, in fairness, deductions are to
be allowed to the end that net income, the final basis for the assessment of the
tax, be ascertained. But its ascertainment is evidently to be based on legiti
mate considerations operating fairly to both parties. Has a loss occurred not
in some manner compensated for or have the directors extended a credit which,
by reason of the subsequent insolvency of the debtor, becomes a “worthless
debt,” the law permits a deduction in arriving at net income, but it certainly
contemplates that from legitimate transactions legitimate results shall be
deduced and not that a corporation and its sole stockholder who is its president
and in fact its board of directors shall so illegitimately manipulate its affairs
as to relieve from taxation a large part of its assets otherwise taxable.
The transaction can only be given the effect claimed, if at all, upon the theory
of the entity of the corporation as distinct from the stockholders. That theory
is so generally recognized in the cases as well as the text books that it must be
deemed beyond the pale of disputation, but both classes of authorities deal with
the corporation as in the exercise of its legitimate functions. It ordinarily
evidences a community of interests belonging ultimately to a number of stock
holders, and the division among a number of stockholders furnishes basis for
the theory that the combining of these separate interests by incorporation
creates a separate entity. But after all it is but a fiction necessarily resorted
to in most cases to permit the working out of the legitimate purposes of the
corporation.
■ In United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., in the circuit court
for the eastern district of Wisconsin (142 Fed., 247), Justice Sanborn re
views at length the origin, purposes, and departures from this theory of a
corporation as a separate legal entity and finally announces this conclusion:
“If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it
is that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule,
and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but when the notion of
legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud
or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of
persons.”
Whether the transaction under review be regarded as a loan of corporate
assets to a stockholder or as an appropriation of corporate assets by an officer
of the corporation and their application to the payment of individual debts, it
was wrong, but upon an even broader ground it must be condemned, because,
if to be regarded as legitimate for the purposes here sought, it must result
that one thus owning all the stock of a corporation and absolutely controlling
its affairs with the aid of dummy directors of his own creation, can, through
the medium of such a transaction and resort to the theory of a separate cor
porate entity relieve absolutely from taxation a large sum of money otherwise
taxable. We are so convinced that upon this theory alone the transaction
can not be made to serve the purpose for which it is invoked that we do not
discuss the other question referred to above.
We are not unmindful of the fact that another corporation was called upon
to pay this tax, but that fact can not change the necessary conclusion. If
equities were to be weighed the conclusion must be unchanged, for the only
reasonable inference is that those interested as incorporators and officers of
the plaintiff company must have been fully conversant with the situation.
We find no right in the plaintiff to recover, and therefore dismiss its petition.

132

